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I. INTRODUCTION 
When scholars speak of the Burger Court, they often mention 
the curtailing of individual rights in the criminal justice arena,1 
federalism decisions,2 its “rootless activism,”3 a failure in equal 
 
       †  David L. Hudson, Jr., is a Justice Robert H. Jackson Legal Fellow with the 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) and the Newseum Institute 
First Amendment Fellow. He teaches at the Nashville School of Law and Vanderbilt 
Law School. He would like to thank his co-author Emily Harvey, the student editors 
of the Mitchell Hamline Law Review, and Azhar Majeed of FIRE. 
       †† Emily H. Harvey is the senior judicial law clerk for the Hon. Frank G. 
Clement, Jr., of the Tennessee Court of Appeals.   
 1. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 14, 44 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Note, Warrantless 
Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 
68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 129, 141, 144–45 (1982). 
 2. See David Scott Louk, Note, Repairing the Irreparable: Revisiting the Federalism 
Decisions of the Burger Court, 125 YALE L.J. 682, 686–87, 694, 710, 724–25 (2016); Lea 
Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A 
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
833, 836, 839–40 (1985).  
 3. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE 
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 198–217 (Vincent Blasi 
ed., 1983) (discussing the development of the judicial activism employed by the 
Burger Court via various case law examples). 
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protection analysis,4 significant developments in sex discrimination 
law,5 or even a general lack of direction.6  
Whatever its successes or failures in other areas, the Burger 
Court impacted First Amendment law in a meaningful way. This 
impact is best shown by the creation of three legal tests in distinct 
areas of First Amendment law: the Establishment Clause, obscenity, 
and commercial speech.7 These three tests are the Lemon test, the 
Miller test, and the Central Hudson test.8 Despite criticism, all three 
tests remain leading standards in their respective areas of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.9 This article provides an overview of 
each of these seminal tests, assesses how they fared in subsequent 
years, and offers thoughts on their continuing vitality.10 
II. THE LEMON TEST 
The Lemon test comes from the Burger Court’s 1971 decision in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman.11 The case involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania 
law that provided financial support to nonpublic schools, including 
parochial schools, in the form of teacher salaries, textbooks, and 
other instructional materials.12 Alton Lemon, a member of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, agreed to be the plaintiff 
challenging the constitutionality of the law.13 At the Supreme Court 
 
 4. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to 
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1000, 1015 (1994).  
 5. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court’s Grappling with Sex 
Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T, 
supra note 3, at 132–56 (highlighting the influence of changing social and economic 
conditions in the 1970s as factors affecting the Burger Court’s developed body of 
law regarding sex discrimination).  
 6. Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1437 (1987).  
 7. David L. Hudson, Jr., Will Roberts Court Flip Burger Precedents?, NEWSEUM INST. 
(May 9, 2008), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2008/05/09/will-roberts-court-
flip-burger-precedents/ [https://perma.cc/L9V7-SXDJ] [hereinafter Hudson, Jr., 
Roberts Court].  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Specifically, this article first analyzes the Lemon test, see infra Part II, next 
addresses the Miller test, see infra Part III, and finally discusses the Central Hudson 
test, see infra Part IV. 
 11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 12. Id. at 610–11. 
 13. David L. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, Out of Limelight, Still Tracks          
Church-State Issues, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 19, 2004), http:// 
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level, Lemon’s case was consolidated with another case, Disenso v. 
Robinson,14 from Rhode Island.15 In Disenso, the plaintiff challenged 
the constitutionality of the state supplementing the salaries of 
nonpublic elementary school teachers.16  
In examining the statutes, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
acknowledged that the language of the Establishment Clause was “at 
best opaque.”17 He identified what he called “cumulative criteria” 
gleaned from previous cases.18 These “cumulative criteria,” or three 
tests, collectively became known as the Lemon test.19 Chief Justice 
Burger explained:  
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute 
must not foster “an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.”20 
In its original iteration, the Lemon test had three prongs: 
purpose, effect, and entanglement.21 Thus, for a governmental 
program or regulation to be constitutional under the Lemon test, it 
must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that does not advance 
or inhibit religion, and not foster an excessive entanglement 
between church and state.22 Chief Justice Burger pulled the first two 
prongs from Board of Education v. Allen,23 the decision on loaning 
textbooks to students attending parochial schools.24 Walz v. Tax 
 
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/lemon-plaintiff-out-of-limelight-still-tracks-church-
state-issues/ [https://perma.cc/2DXJ-FTWC] [hereinafter Hudson, Jr., Lemon 
Plaintiff]. 
 14. 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970). 
 15. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07. 
 16. Id. at 607.  
 17. Id. at 612.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, supra note 13. 
 20. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)). 
 21. Hudson, Jr., Lemon Plaintiff, supra note 13. 
 22. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (first citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 
(1968); then citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (1970)). 
 23. 392 U.S. 236. 
 24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
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Commission, 25 the church property tax exemption decision, formed 
the basis for the last prong.26 
Chief Justice Burger determined that both the Pennsylvania and 
Rhode Island laws passed the purpose prong as the state legislatures 
had the secular purpose of improving education.27 However, he held 
that both statutes involved excessive entanglement between church 
and state.28 The state laws provided that government officials would 
ensure that state aid would fund only secular education.29 However, 
the Court reasoned that state officials would have to engage in 
comprehensive surveillance to ensure that the money was not being 
used to fund religious instruction: “[a] comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be 
required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First 
Amendment otherwise respected.”30 
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Lemon test in many 
Establishment Clause cases through the years.31 In fact, the Lemon 
test was the dominant test for more than a decade.32 Despite its 
widespread use, the Court has not been consistent in using the Lemon 
 
 25. 397 U.S. 664.  
 26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 27. Id. (“[T]he statutes . . . are intended to enhance the quality of the secular 
education in all schools . . . .”). 
 28. Id. at 613–14.  
 29. See id. at 616.  
 30. Id. at 619.  
 31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) (using the Lemon 
test to invalidate a Louisiana law requiring balanced treatment of creationism and 
evolution in science classes); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985) (using the 
Lemon test to invalidate an Alabama moment of silence law that sought to return 
prayer to the public schools); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 
(1982) (using the Lemon test to invalidate a Massachusetts law that gave churches 
the power to veto liquor licenses); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 128 
(1977) (using the Lemon test to invalidate a New York law allowing private schools 
to recover money from the state); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 744–
45 (1976) (using the Lemon test to uphold a Maryland law that provided aid to 
private religious schools).  
 32. Cf. Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal 
Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 665, 673 (2008) (“[T]he dominant test for constitutionality under the 
Establishment Clause was the . . . test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.”). 
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test.33 One example is Marsh v. Chambers.34 In Marsh, the Eighth 
Circuit used the Lemon test to invalidate the Nebraska legislature’s 
practice of having chaplain-led prayer before sessions.35 But the 
Supreme Court upheld the practice and ignored the Lemon test.36 
Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the history and tradition of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer.37 In response, Justice 
William Brennan authored a dissenting opinion and criticized the 
majority opinion for failing to apply Lemon, which he called “the 
most commonly cited formulation of prevailing Establishment 
Clause doctrine.”38  
Marsh was only the beginning of the Court’s inconsistent use of 
the Lemon test.39 For example, in examining the constitutionality of 
a Ten Commandments monument in a Texas public park, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in 2005: “Whatever may be the fate 
of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of 
passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds.”40 
While some justices have defended the Lemon test,41 several 
Justices have also criticized it. Most colorfully, Justice Antonin Scalia 
referred to it as a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie” that “stalks 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”42 He voted to grant 
 
 33. See Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An Overview of the 
Lemon Test and Its Application, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 641, 649 (2010) (discussing the 
inconsistent application of the Lemon test). 
 34. 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983). 
 35. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 
783 (1983); see also Kathrik Ravinshankar, The Establishment Clause’s Hydra: The 
Lemon Test in the Circuit Courts, 41 DAYTON L. REV. 261, 274 (2016) (“Perhaps 
illustrating problems with the Lemon test in the legislative prayer setting, the Eighth 
Circuit reached opposite conclusions in Chambers v. Marsh and Bogen v. Doty despite 
applying Lemon to seemingly similar facts.”). 
 36. Marsh, 464 U.S. 783, 783 (1983). 
 37. Id. at 786.  
 38. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
 39. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 642 (“The Court has continued to use [the 
Lemon] test erratically, at times revising and at others despising it . . . .”). 
 40. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005).  
 41. For example, Justice Lewis Powell defended the Lemon test as “the only 
coherent test a majority of the Court has ever adopted.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 42. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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certiorari in a case simply to “inter” the Lemon test.43 Justice Clarence 
Thomas has blasted the test as “utterly indeterminate.”44 In 1985, 
then Associate Justice William Rehnquist said the test “has simply not 
provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause 
cases.”45 Justice Byron White wrote in 1976: “I am no more 
reconciled now to Lemon than when it was decided.”46 
Numerous legal commentators have also criticized the Lemon 
test on a variety of grounds. Professor Jesse Choper criticized the test 
for helping create a “conceptual disaster area” in aid to religious 
education cases.47 Another leading commentator explained that the 
test has led to inconsistent results.48 Some have attacked the purpose 
prong specifically.49 Others have focused their attention on the 
entanglement prong, contending that it is unnecessary or should 
merely be a part of the effects prong.50 
The Court has created a variety of other tests for Establishment 
Clause cases. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Court used a 
history and tradition analysis to uphold a state practice of having 
prayer before legislative sessions.51 In another case, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor offered “a clarification” of Lemon called the 
 
 43. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“I would grant certiorari in this case if 
only to take the opportunity to inter Lemon test once for all.”).  
 44. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, 565 U.S. 994, 1001 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).  
 45. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 46. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring).  
 47. Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 5, 6 (1987).  
 48. William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”—The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986).  
 49. Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the 
Pursuit of a Secular Legislative Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS. L.J. 351, 407–
10 (2010); Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik Michael Zimmerman, Posting the Ten 
Commandments is a “Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion?”: How McCreary 
County v. ACLU Illustrates the Need to Reexamine the Lemon Test and Its Purpose Prong, 
23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 25 (2006); Jeffrey S. Theuer, The Lemon Test and Subjective 
Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 KY. 
L.J. 1061 (1988).  
 50. See Heather S. Savage, Note, The School Voucher Debate: Recasting the Third 
Prong of the Lemon Test, 45 HOW. L.J. 465, 483 (2002) (“The decisions prove that 
excessive entanglement should not stand on its own, but rather should be directly 
linked with the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”). 
 51. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).  
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“endorsement test.”52 In yet another case, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
offered forth a coercion analysis.53  
In 1997, the Court seemingly modified the Lemon test by folding 
the entanglement prong into the effects prong.54 However, many 
lower courts still apply all three prongs of the Lemon test.55 A federal 
district court judge recently referred to the Lemon test as the 
“benchmark” in granting preliminary injunctive relief against 
President Donald Trump’s travel ban.56 
In fact, while it has faced a litany of criticism, the Lemon test 
survives and even thrives, particularly in the lower courts.57 As 
attorney Karthik Ravishankar wrote in 2016: “The funeral procession 
has arrived too early. Despite the Court’s clear ambivalence about 
Lemon, the circuits continue to employ the test in the vast majority of 
Establishment Clause cases.”58 One commentator claimed that 
Lemon was the best test for Establishment Clause cases, particularly 
in evaluating the constitutionality of graduation prayer.59 
III. THE MILLER TEST 
The Miller test comes from the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision 
in Miller v. California.60 The test deals with obscenity, an unprotected 
category of speech that has confounded numerous Supreme Court 
Justices through the years.61 Justice John Marshall Harlan II famously 
 
 52. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).   
 53. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 54. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–34 (1997). 
 55. See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(emphasizing that the Tenth Circuit applies all three prongs of the Lemon test); Am. 
Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating 
that panels of this court are “required to follow this precedent”).  
 56. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1235 (D. Haw. 2017) (“Lemon . . . 
provides the benchmark for evaluating whether governmental action is consistent 
with or at odds with the Establishment Clause.” (citations omitted)). 
 57. Alexander, supra note 33, at 641 (describing the Lemon test as the “leading 
method” to determine whether there is an Establishment Clause violation). 
 58. Ravishankar, supra note 35 at 263. 
 59. Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to 
Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 231, 233 (1999). 
 60. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 61. John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web; 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1691, 1691 
(2007) (“Whereas the Supreme Court has held that obscenity is defined by 
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referred to it as the “intractable obscenity problem.”62 More 
famously, Justice Potter Stewart once wrote that he perhaps could 
not intelligibly define obscenity but claimed, “I know when I see          
it . . . .”63 
Prior to Miller, some American courts adopted an obscenity test 
from a nineteenth century English case, Regina v. Hicklin,64 known as 
the Hicklin test.65 That test allowed for obscenity prosecutions based 
on the impact of isolated passages on the most susceptible of 
persons.66 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Hicklin test in Roth 
v. United States, and instead adopted the test used by several lower 
courts: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as 
a whole appeals to prurient interest.”67  
In the next decade, three Justices adopted a three-part test, 
sometimes called the Memoirs test, that required: “(a) the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest 
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary community standards relating to the description or 
representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly 
without redeeming social value.”68 
However, as indicated, only three Justices agreed with the 
Memoirs formulation.69 This eventually caused the Supreme Court to 
review obscenity cases on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis in a process 
known as “Redruping”70—after the Court’s decision in Redrup v. New 
 
reference to ‘contemporary community standards,’ it is not clear whose community 
standard applies . . . .”). 
 62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16 (citing Interstate Cir., Inc. v. City of Dall., 390 U.S. 
676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 63. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 64. [1868] 3 QB 360 (Eng.). 
 65. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, § 13:2. The Standard Established in Regina v. Hicklin, 
in RIGHTS & LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, BROADCAST, AND PRINT (2d ed. 
2017) (citing Hicklin, [1868] 3 QB 360 at 363–64). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
 68. A Book Named ‘John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure’ v. Att’y 
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., To ‘Deprave and Corrupt,’ 38 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 401, 
416 (1993) (reviewing EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW 
OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS (1992)) (“Summary reversals of           
lower-court obscenity convictions soon became routine in a process known as 
‘Redrupping’ . . . .”). 
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York.71 Under this process, if five Justices agreed under different legal 
tests that the material was not obscene, the court would reverse 
convictions summarily72 during a process known as “Movie Day.”73  
The Burger Court revisited obscenity in Miller v. California74 and 
created what is still known today as the Miller test.75 In Miller, Melvin 
Miller mailed five unsolicited brochures to the manager of a 
restaurant and his mother containing explicit pictures and drawings 
of men and women engaged in a variety of sexual activities.76 The 
State of California convicted Mr. Miller of violating a state statute 
that made it a misdemeanor to knowingly distribute obscene 
material.77  
The Court initially noted that the First Amendment did not 
protect obscenity, while recognizing that the Court had struggled in 
previous cases to define it.78 Then, the Court outlined a                   
three-pronged test to guide the trier-of-fact in distinguishing 
obscenity from other, protected speech:  
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary 
community standards would find the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.79  
Thereafter, federal and state governments enacted obscenity 
statutes that adopted the language of the three-pronged test from 
 
 71. See 386 U.S. 767, 770 (1967). 
 72. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (“In the face of 
this divergence of opinion the Court began the practice in Redrup v. New York, of 
per curiam reversals of convictions for the dissemination of materials that, at least 
five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, deemed not to be 
obscene.”). 
 73. See Phyllis Schlafly, The Morality of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 99 (2008) (“The court held ‘movie day[s]’ where the Justices 
and their clerks would watch the films at issue in pornography cases.”) (citing BOB 
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 198 
(1979)). 
 74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 75. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 612 n.7 (2002) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 
16–18). 
 76. Miller, 413 U.S at 16–18. 
 77. Id. at 16. 
 78. Id. at 23. 
 79. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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Miller.80 In a subsequent case, Pope v. Illinois, the Court held that the 
trier of fact should apply local community standards to the first two 
prongs and a national standard to the third prong.81 
In the ensuing decades, the Miller test would face its greatest 
challenge with the invention and proliferation of the Internet. The 
Supreme Court threw down the gauntlet in Ashcroft v. ACLU, when 
several members of the Court questioned the constitutionality of 
applying aspects of the Miller test to Internet speech.82 In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that applying 
local community standards might lead to the substantial suppression 
of protected speech, writing: 
A Web publisher in a community where avant garde culture 
is the norm may have no desire to reach a national market; 
he may wish only to speak to his neighbors; nevertheless, if 
an eavesdropper in a more traditional, rural community 
chooses to listen in, there is nothing the publisher can do.83 
Justice Kennedy also questioned what it would mean to evaluate 
Internet speech “as a whole,” when content on a webpage often 
connects to other websites.84 The lower courts wrestled with these 
questions when the Department of Justice, under President George 
W. Bush, initiated a series of high-profile Internet obscenity 
prosecutions.85 In United States v. Kilbride, for example, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that courts should apply a 
national community standard when the obscenity prosecution 
involved Internet speech.86 However, in United States v. Stagliano, a 
federal district court found that the local standard was 
constitutional.87 That court also addressed the “as a whole” 
requirement in the context of a movie trailer posted on a 
pornographic website.88 The court ruled that the trailer would not 
be judged in isolation but in a broader context that would 
 
 80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.1 (2017); A.C.A. § 5-68302(5) (2017); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 311 (2017). 
 81. 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987). 
 82. 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 83. Id. at 595–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 600 (quoting U.S.C. §§ 231(e)(6)(A), (C) (2017)). 
 85. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Obscenity Prosecutions and the Bush 
Administration: The Inside Perspective of the Adult Entertainment Industry & Defense 
Attorney Louis Sirkin, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 235 (2007). 
 86. 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 87. 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 88. Id. at 33–35. 
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encompass, at a minimum, the web page on which the trailer was 
posted.89 In contrast, in United States v. Little, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that five video trailers posted 
on a pornographic website were properly viewed as five separate 
works.90 
In United States v. Extreme Associates, the defendant, a purveyor of 
Internet pornography, avoided the Miller test altogether and argued 
that the obscenity statutes violated substantive due process.91 The 
federal district court in Pennsylvania agreed and held that the 
defendant had third-party standing under Craig v. Boren92 to assert 
the rights of its customers.93 The court contended that, under Stanley 
v. Georgia,94 the customers of the defendant had a fundamental right 
to view whatever material they wanted in the privacy of their own 
homes, and that the federal obscenity statutes placed an 
impermissible burden on that right.95 The defendant’s argument 
lost traction, however, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit considered the case,96 reversed the district court’s decision, 
and returned to the Miller test.97  
The Justice Department’s focus on obscenity prosecutions 
under George W. Bush slowed during the Obama administration,98 
but there is some indication that Attorney General Jeff Sessions will 
revive it.99 In 2010, when District Court Judge Richard J. Leon 
dismissed the obscenity charges against the defendant in United States 
v. Stagliano, he expressed concern over the “difficult, challenging 
 
 89. Id. at 36–37. 
 90. 365 Fed. Appx. 159, 165 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 91. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (W.D. Pa. 
2005), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 92. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 93. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
 94. 394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969).  
 95. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
 96. Extreme Assocs. Inc., 431 F.3d at 156. 
 97. Id. at 162. 
 98. See George Weaver, Obama Administration Fails Obscenity Test, WORLD NEWS 
GROUP (Apr. 24, 2013, 9:45 AM), https://world.wng.org/2013/04/obama_admin 
istration_fails_obscenity_test# [https://perma.cc/3DE9-2HQJ] (noting that in 
2013, “[g]overnment prosecutors ha[d] tried only two adult obscenity cases since 
2009”). 
 99. See Sessions Hearing: Obscenity, C-SPAN (Jan. 11, 2017), www.c-
span.org/video/?c4644425/sessions-hearing-obscenity [https://perma.cc/5KYE-
75W2]. 
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and novel questions” the case raised for obscenity law.100 He stated, 
“I hope that [higher] courts and Congress will give greater guidance 
to judges in whose courtrooms these cases will be tried.”101 Thus, the 
Miller test is still intact, but questions remain. 
IV. THE CENTRAL HUDSON TEST 
The Burger Court also created the leading test for evaluating 
whether a regulation of purely commercial advertising violates the 
First Amendment. Known as the Central Hudson test, it comes from 
the decision bearing its name—Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Public Service Commission of N.Y.102 
In the past, commercial speech received no free speech 
protection. The Court declared in 1942 that “the Constitution 
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”103 This rule reigned for three decades until 
the Court finally recognized the value of commercial speech in the 
mid-1970s.104 In 1976, the Court declared that the old rule was of 
“doubtful validity”105 and declared that “the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensable.”106 
While the Court recognized that commercial speech received 
free speech protection, it did not create a test for evaluating such 
restrictions.107 The Court did so in Central Hudson, which involved 
the constitutionality of a New York rule banning “promotional 
advertising” by electrical utilities.108 In the decision, Justice Lewis 
Powell crafted the Central Hudson test, writing:  
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech 
to come within that provision, it at least must concern 
 
 100. Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. District Judge Drops Porn Charges Against Video Producer 
John A. Stagliano, WASH. POST (July 17, 2010), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/16/AR2010071605750.html [https://perma.cc/G 
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 101. Id. 
 102. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 103. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).  
 104. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 6.2 (2012) [hereinafter HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES].  
 105. Va. State Bd. Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
759 (1976).  
 106. Id. at 765.  
 107. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, supra note 104, § 6.5.  
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lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether 
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.109 
Under the Central Hudson test the first prong—the threshold 
prong—asks: does the speech “concern lawful activity” and is it       
non-misleading?110 If the speech at issue meets this prong, then the 
Central Hudson test involves analysis of three additional prongs: (1) 
the government must have a substantial interest; (2) the regulation 
must directly and materially advance the government’s substantial 
interest; and (3) the regulation must be narrowly tailored.111 The 
Central Hudson test is a form of intermediate scrutiny,112 as the 
government only has to put forth a substantial governmental interest, 
rather than a compelling governmental interest in a strict scrutiny 
analysis.113 Furthermore, the government does not have to justify its 
restriction as the least restrictive means.114 
The Central Hudson test remains the dominant test in 
commercial speech jurisprudence.115 However, several Justices have 
criticized it. Justice Clarence Thomas called for its abdication in his 
concurring opinion in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, writing:  
 
 109. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980).  
 110. Id. at 564 (stating that under such circumstances, “the government’s power 
is more circumscribed”).  
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 112. Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of 
Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 537 (2013).  
 113. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (requiring only a substantial government 
interest to restrict commercial speech); Rostron, supra note 112, at 537 (“The Court 
has emphasized that [the Central Hudson test] is a ‘lesser’ level of protection than 
that afforded to other types of speech.”). But cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 
(1984) (“[T]o pass constitutional muster” under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
governmental actions “must be justified by a compelling governmental               
interest . . . .”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541(1942) (introducing the 
concept of “strict scrutiny” in reviewing the constitutionality of a government action 
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time in a Supreme Court case).  
 114. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“We . . . 
conclude that the reason of the matter requires something short of a                         
least-restrictive-means standard.”). 
 115. HUDSON, JR., LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES, supra note 104, § 6.5 (“[T]he so-called 
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In my view, the Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh 
incommensurables—the value of knowledge versus the 
value of ignorance—and to apply contradictory premises—
that informed adults are the best judges of their own 
interests, and that they are not. Rather than continuing to 
apply a test that makes no sense to me when the asserted 
state interest is of the type involved here, I would return to 
the reasoning and holding of Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy.116  
In the same decision, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that he 
“share[d] Justice Thomas’s discomfort with the Central Hudson test, 
which seems to have nothing more than policy intuition to support 
it.”117 Additionally, numerous legal commentators have criticized the 
commercial speech doctrine and the Central Hudson test. Judge Alex 
Kozinski and Stuart Banner famously critiqued the doctrine in their 
oft-cited article Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?.118 In their article, 
the authors disagreed with the notion that it is easier to identify the 
truth or falsity of commercial speech than it is of other forms of 
speech.119 They also questioned whether commercial speech was 
more durable than other forms of speech.120 Additionally, the 
authors demonstrated the difficulty in determining whether speech 
should be classified as commercial speech, noncommercial speech, 
or some mixture.121 Another leading commentator has referred to 
the current protection of commercial speech as “half-hearted.”122 
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Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech may not be 
restricted at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing 
terms).  
 117. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 118. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627 (1990). 
 119. Id. at 635. 
 120. Id. at 637–38 (challenging the oft-held “durability” justification by 
juxtaposing commercial speech against other major profit generating—yet fully 
protected—forms of speech like films, music recordings, and books). 
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Still another commentator has referred to the Central Hudson test as 
a “malleable standard that has resulted in inconsistent outcomes.”123 
The Court edged closer to applying more than intermediate 
scrutiny in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.124 Here, while faced with a First 
Amendment challenge to state regulation of prescriber-related 
information, the Court held that content based restrictions on 
commercial speech should receive “heightened judicial scrutiny.”125 
However, the Court proceeded to apply the Central Hudson test.126 
This prompted one commentator to refer to the test as “the Central 
Hudson Zombie.”127  
The U.S. Supreme Court has moved closer to applying more 
than intermediate scrutiny to at least some forms of commercial 
speech regulation.128 However, the Central Hudson test has proven 
“oddly resilient.”129 It remains the dominant test used by lower courts 
in commercial speech cases.130 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Burger Court impacted First Amendment jurisprudence, 
primarily through the creation of leading tests and standards for 
 
 123. See Kayla R. Burns, Note, Reducing the Inherent Malleability of Mid-Level 
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lower courts to apply.131 Three of those tests—the Lemon test,132 the 
Miller test,133 and the Central Hudson test134—remain governing law 
decades later.135 Future First Amendment cases will demonstrate if 
the Roberts Court will flip these Burger Court precedents.136 
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